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CHAPTER 22

NATIONALISM IN THE ERA OF THE NATION STATE, 1870-1945

PIETER M. JUDSON

UNDER the first German nation state (1870-1945), nationalism became a more potent and, occasionally, a destabilizing force in politics and social life than it had previously been in German society. With the creation of a German nation state, governments and administrators began to treat nationalism as a legitimate tool for the promotion of their official policies at the same time that all manner of activists, politicians, journalists, and reformers used nationalist rhetoric to legitimate their diverse programs for Germany and claims on the state. Although nationalists' programs sought to forge social stability by unifying Germans divided by region, class, and confession in a national community, their activism could produce the opposite effect. Issues such as the national interest, membership in the nation, or the state's effectiveness at pursuing the national interest became at times the subjects of heated public debate with a potential to produce political instability. Debates such as these were hardly new to German society, but after 1870 issues such as the character of the German nation or membership in the national community became legal and administrative questions, not simply subjects of political or philosophical discussion. Germany's rulers often found themselves walking a fine line between encouraging a nationalist activism they believed could help to unify the new German society and dampening nationalism's more radical manifestations. This balancing act became especially apparent around 1900 as nationalists increasingly used mass appeals tinged with ideological radicalism to question the ability of Germany's conservative rulers to represent the interests of the national community adequately and effectively.

For many years historians viewed nationalism as a tool wielded largely by Germany's highly conservative rulers for the purpose of manipulating political life in a rapidly industrializing society. Nationalist and patriotic enthusiasm in Imperial German

society, it was believed, had papered over growing differences among interest groups by deflecting popular attention away from social and economic complaints.¹ This argument saw Germany's pursuit of an ambitious colonial policy in the 1880s and 1890s, and its increasingly aggressive foreign policy choices after 1900, as products of a dangerous attempt by the elite to incite nationalist feeling and thereby master the domestic political opposition. There are two obvious disadvantages to viewing German nationalism in this framework. In the first place, while it may be tempting to see nationalism largely in terms of the policies and practices of the nation state, doing so would hide from view the vitality of social movements in an age of mass politics that wrapped their own claims against the state in the mantle of nationalism. Popular nationalism in Germany was far more a product of the imaginative rhetorical and organizational strategies devised by activists than it was a product of state manipulation. In the second place, viewing nationalism as a product of elite manipulation forces us to view it as a fundamentally unifying force in society, rather than seeing its often unpredictable and destabilizing dynamic qualities.

The proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 transformed the challenges Germany's small and relatively elite groups of nationalists had recently faced. With the birth of the federal German state nationalists transferred their efforts from the achievement of political unification to the creation of a unified national society. They continued to justify their programs by claiming to speak for the national community even as their key goal was to create such a community in the first place. From the start, the project of nationalizing Germany's citizens faced several unexpected obstacles. At first, existing regional loyalties and popular devotion to familiar symbols, rituals, and practices of local politics (not necessarily to local regimes) continued to provide many educated Germans with a more compelling sense of identification than did an unfamiliar German nation state dominated by Prussia. To local observers, the dimensions and qualities of the new Germany often seemed more abstract than real. Despite aggressive nationalist propaganda churned out by reputable historians, writers, and journalists, segments of the educated population in parts of Baden, Saxony, Bavaria, or Württemberg viewed the German nation state with skepticism, often precisely because the new state broke so dramatically with familiar practices and traditions.²

The challenge to nationalists was to produce and popularize a unifying idea that would attract German citizens of diverse backgrounds, religions, and regional practices. However, in the early years after 1871, most nationalists produced relatively narrow and triumphalist understandings of the German national community. The qualities that defined Germanness for these early activists derived largely from their own Protestant religious affiliation and bourgeois class experience.³ Most nationalists had belonged to National Liberal parties in the various federal states; they were men who had agitated for small-German (*kleindeutsch*) unification under Prussia for two decades. Their efforts tended to reach a limited public for whom bourgeois and Protestant narratives of nationhood already held a kind of common sense persuasiveness.⁴ In their efforts the National Liberals profited enormously from their political collaboration with the Prussian leader Otto von Bismarck, architect of unification and Chancellor of the new

Germany. In the 1870s Bismarck's policies directed against the Catholic hierarchy (the so-called *Kulturkampf*) appeared to lend government support to a particular liberal and Protestant conviction about what constituted German nationhood. It encouraged the National Liberals to question openly whether Germany's Catholics could ever legitimately be considered part of the national community. The government's persecution of clerics, newspaper editors, and laymen, who had allegedly defied the new laws, not only produced a popular Catholic backlash, but also confirmed for many Germans that the new nation was in fact a narrowly partisan Liberal and Prussian creation.⁵

Their desire to diminish the influence of political Catholicism, especially in the Southern German states and among Polish-speakers in the East, was only one concern that animated the liberals to support the *Kulturkampf*. Liberal enthusiasm for the *Kulturkampf* ultimately derived less from questions of Church state relations than from deeper presumptions about the nation's fundamental values. Liberal Protestant writers habitually associated Catholicism with a culture of feminine dependence unworthy of a nation of independent citizens because it allegedly subjected people to an absolutist form of belief and political rule. By contrast, the liberals' vision of the new Germany rested on a middle-class masculine ideal of personal independence and active citizenship that they explicitly associated with their Protestant beliefs. Liberals also accused Catholicism of fostering international loyalties at the expense of national ones, loyalties that they also associated with Germany's linguistic minorities, most of whom also happened to be Catholics. Along with the taint of their alleged indifference to the national community, liberal writers also associated both Catholicism and linguistic diversity with ignorance, superstition, economic backwardness, and untoward foreign influence. Some liberals like historian Heinrich von Treitschke doubted that a society troubled by religious and ethnic diversity could ever succeed as a national society.⁶ As an illustration of this fear they pointed to the Habsburg Monarchy whose Catholic status and linguistic diversity allegedly required the imposition of absolutist forms of rule that they considered unworthy of Germany's free citizens.⁷

National liberal efforts to forge a more unified nation of Germans that rejected religious and ethnic diversity merely intensified ideological division at every level of society. In political terms, the *Kulturkampf* helped create a mass-based Catholic Center Party that sought to unite German Catholics of all classes and regions in defense against state persecution. In social and cultural terms the *Kulturkampf* also produced popular irritation and some suspicion against the very idea of nation. To some Germans the public invocations of the 'nation' in local rituals implied the Liberals' particular version of nationhood, and this is reflected in accounts of failed local celebrations of national unity in the 1870s and early 1880s. While specific commemorations of the war against France appealed to most Germans, for example, they tended to view annual Sedan day celebrations as National Liberal events.⁸

Over time, the end to the *Kulturkampf* policies, and the increasing experience of living in a German nation state made nationalism a more popular phenomenon throughout Germany. By the 1890s nationalists had more successfully linked inclusive concepts of nation to familiar local traditions and loyalties.⁹ With the waning of the

Kulturkampf in the 1880s, the goals of the state in propagating nationalist values and ideologies had also parted company from the efforts of the early nationalist activists. Reversing course, the state gradually sought to integrate Germany's Catholics more fully into the national community. Official state nationalism sought to stabilize society by minimizing the confessional and regional conflicts of an earlier era and by unifying different social forces around policies that appealed specifically to nationalist or patriotic sentiment. Some versions of this *Sammlungspolitik* tried to unify differing groups on the basis of their common support for German colonialism, or, more frequently, on the basis of their common hostility to internationalist socialism. By the 1890s, the rhetorical challenges posed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to the regime offered Germany's chancellors promising new opportunities to build coalitions among a broad array of groups whose joint antipathy to socialism purchased a tenuous nationalist unity.

Despite the ideological attractions of this *Sammlungspolitik*, many nationalist activists and organizations refused to follow the lead of the state, treating such initiatives with caution and even with cynicism and suspicion. Those activists who had seen Catholicism as a fundamental danger to the German nation, for example, did not simply abandon their anti-Catholicism just because Bismarck had done so. At issue for them was not national unification, but rather the *terms* under which it would be accomplished; not the national community as a fact, but the *way* that this community was to be imagined.¹⁰ Many Protestant liberals continued to assert their highly specific vision of the nation for Germany, warning that accommodation with Catholicism would undermine precisely those qualities that made the German nation distinctive and strong. In 1887, for example, the founders of an organization designed to build support for this perspective, the Protestant League, typically asserted that while government concessions to Catholics might purchase a degree of national unity, it would be at the cost of subverting the very character and identity of the nation.

In the 1880s, thanks largely to Bismarck's enormous personal prestige in nationalist circles, this kind of rivalry between proponents of state and more narrowly defined forms of nationalism had remained muted. Another issue that rallied nationalists behind the state and where both appeared to share a more ethnic definition of nation was in their common desire for a Germanization of Prussia's Eastern provinces in the 1880s. In 1871 Germany's Polish-speakers had comprised around 6% of the population of the new state.¹¹ This seemingly small percentage masked the fact that in several Prussian districts, Polish speakers constituted over 80% of the population.¹² Bismarck's pursuit of the *Kulturkampf* in the 1870s had derived in part from his concern about potential resistance to the new state from Polish-speaking Catholics. Many of Bismarck's subsequent policies, including limiting the use of Polish language in the public sphere and weakening the influence of the Catholic Church, constituted forcible attempts to assimilate Germany's Polish-speaking citizens into a German national community.¹³ When these measures failed over time to produce the desired results, however, Bismarck sought to diminish the size of the Polish-speaking population through even harsher measures that included the outright deportation of

(non-citizen) migrant laborers to Russia. To support these ends the Prussian government had long pursued a small-scale policy of German ethnic land colonization in the East, founding a Royal Prussian Settlement Commission in 1866 that bought land held by Polish estate owners, divided it up, and sold parcels at subsidized rates to German farmers from the West.¹⁴ Over time, however, the colonization policy had aggravated relations between the more radical nationalists and traditional conservatives in Prussia. Conservatives—especially large estate owners—relied on cheap Polish-speaking migrant labor from Russia and opposed nationalist demands to end this practice. Radical nationalists meanwhile, dissatisfied with the small-scale efforts of the colonization commission, demanded an end to the migration of cheap labor into Germany and the forcible division of more Polish estates into family-sized plots to benefit German settlers.

The government's ambivalent policies—what nationalists would call half measures—reflected its attempt to balance its concerns about the potentially subversive activities of Polish nationalist activists against the need for agricultural labor on the great estates. However the nationalist presumption (German or Polish) that use of the Polish language somehow expressed an individual's Polish national loyalty or rejection of Germany reflected a fundamental misreading of local conditions. Whether or to what extent Poles (those with a sense of Polish national identity) and Polish-speakers in Prussia identified with any nation is a question that cannot easily be answered, as several local studies have demonstrated. The very idea of understanding Germany's Eastern borderland regions primarily in terms of a war to the death between Poles and Germans was more often a projection by German and Polish nationalists of their own thinking onto events in these regions. Many Polish speakers, for example, considered themselves to be loyal citizens of Imperial Germany, and daily life in Silesia or Posen bore little resemblance to the stories of eternal nationalist struggle propagated by activists. Nor did long-term voting patterns in the East betray fundamental or authentic national loyalties. The degree to which Polish-speaking Prussians gave their votes to Polish nationalist parties or to the (German) Catholic Center Party in Silesia, for example, depended more on the situational ability of one or the other party to represent issues of local concern, than on the national identification of their voters.¹⁵

The government's periodic bans on Polish language schools or the use of Polish in public suggested that the government believed that Germany's Polish-speakers could *become* Germans over time, and that this would essentially solve what both nationalists and the government saw as a national problem in the East. Nationalists in turn supported the government's harsh language policies, but they often held different beliefs about the possibilities of assimilating Slavic peoples to the German nation. Their ambivalence on this issue was itself a product of their own activism: the more activists emphasized the distinctive nature of German ethnicity in the East, the less they could imagine the successful Germanization of other peoples. If, indeed, Germans and Poles fundamentally differed from each other, then policies of assimilation could hardly resolve the national struggle.

After Bismarck's resignation in 1890, his successors had appeared to relax many of the regime's harsher anti-Polish measures. With the iconic Bismarck gone, the more

radical of the nationalist activists were far less reluctant to pressure, criticize, and occasionally to attack the German government more openly. They organized several nationalist associations designed to mobilize popular support for their diverse causes and to lobby the government on a broad range of nationalist interests, not simply its Eastern policies. The most successful and popular of these new organizations were the General German School Association (1881) (later the Society for Germandom Abroad or VDA), the Colonial Society (1887), the Pan German League (1891), the Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches (1894), and the Navy League (1898).¹⁶

The Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches, also known as the H-K-T after its founders' initials (von Hanseemann, Kennemann, and von Tiedemann), agitated for tougher policies against Polish speakers in Germany's East. Within a year of its founding the organization already boasted a membership of 20,000.¹⁷ The association raised money to support the work of the Royal Settlement Commission, and to furnish needy towns and villages in the East with German language libraries, books, and periodicals. It also disseminated virulently anti-Polish and anti-Catholic propaganda framed as common-sense German nationalist arguments in its journal, *Die Ostmark*.¹⁸ Along with the *Alldeutsche Blätter* published by the Pan German League, *Die Ostmark* played a dominant role in shaping radical nationalist opinion about Germany's eastern frontiers in other parts of the country as well. To the west in neighboring Saxony, for example, the *Alldeutsche Blätter* attempted, albeit with little success, to raise the alarm about migrant Czech industrial workers from Bohemia who were allegedly intent on founding colonies in Dresden and Leipzig and slavizing this border region as well.¹⁹

Despite their growing influence on nationalist opinion in the rest of Germany, the Pan Germans and the Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches did not attract significant support from most German-speakers who actually lived in Germany's East. In Posen, West Prussia, or Upper Silesia, for example, it was largely peripatetic representatives of the local or state administration from elsewhere in Germany—mid-level civil servants, teachers, Protestant pastors—who joined these nationalist associations in the greatest numbers. Estate owners in the region, as we have seen, strongly disapproved of the Eastern Marches' Society's anti-immigrant stance, given their dependence on seasonal labor from Russia.²⁰ Similarly, German-speaking farmers, industrial workers, and small business owners expressed little interest in the organization. 'H-K-T' stood for a radical Germanizing politics that, unlike the Catholic Center Party's program, was explicitly anti-Polish. Many German-speakers in the East assessed the national situation in more moderate terms than the radical H-K-T-ers and their outside agitators, as one example from nineteenth century Posen suggests: 'A recently arrived civil servant who was as yet inexperienced in the 'Polish Question' didn't see things through quite the same lens as did a local merchant who, although a convinced [German] patriot, nevertheless found it necessary to treat his Polish clients with care.'²¹

By the turn of the century the nationalist associations enjoyed considerable success throughout Germany in attracting members and in shaping middle-class popular opinion about domestic and foreign issues, from Polish policy to colonial settlements in Africa. Their leaders were usually local notables, generally Protestant, high-level civil

servants, businessmen, and academically educated professionals. Originally, each of these associations sought to influence policy by cultivating a close relationship to the government, and most governments between 1895 and 1914 had reciprocated by making resources available to nationalist organizations and by turning to them for help in building public support for policy initiatives. Ideally, as we have seen, the associations sought to add a kind of popular legitimacy to broad political coalitions (*Sammlungen*) around popular nationalist issues, anti-Socialism, or both. This working relationship had led some historians to characterize the relationship between government and popular associations as a specific example of the governing elite's manipulation of mass politics.²² Yet this seamless picture of synergy between a powerful government and an abject civil society hid the combustible threat these organizations actually posed to the ruling elite if things ever got out of hand. Some members who took the expansive ideological missions of these associations seriously did not want to fall into line when the government pursued policies they considered to be too moderate. Furthermore, the expanding social, confessional, and regional memberships of many of these organizations brought frequent challenges to the elite national leadership.²³

The most conspicuous example of the threat that these mass-based nationalist associations could pose to government stability involved the campaign to expand Germany's navy. Starting in 1897, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had pursued a strategy of increased funding for the navy that sought both to minimize the provocation to other naval powers (Britain) on the one hand, while cementing a nationalist parliamentary coalition around increased support for the Navy at home. The Navy League was meant to popularize Tirpitz's growing budgetary requests. As with nationalist criticism of the government's allegedly halfhearted Polish policy in the East, a group of radicals managed to gain temporary control of the Navy League by criticizing the Tirpitz plan for its moderation in the face of international threats to the nation. Demanding a more rapid and expensive naval build-up, the radicals explicitly questioned Tirpitz's (and by extension the Kaiser's) judgment about Germany's national interests, implying that neither man was adequately addressing Germany's military needs. In 1908 the Kaiser himself found it necessary to intervene in the ongoing crisis, threatening to withdraw lucrative government patronage from the Navy League to force the resignation of the offending radicals.²⁴

During the same period, the Pan German League also challenged official state and dynastic forms of nationalism. The government had already angered the League at the time of the Boer War (1899-1902) by not aiding the allegedly ethnic German Boers whose cause many German nationalists had embraced. During the 1905 Moroccan crisis the Pan Germans again criticized the government harshly for failing to obtain tangible colonial concessions for Germany. At that time Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow had responded by deriding the Pan Germans' ignorance of complex policy issues. The last straw for many in the Pan German League, however, came with the publication by the *Daily Telegraph* in 1908 of an interview with the Kaiser. In a rambling monologue Wilhelm II disavowed his alleged support for the Boers a decade earlier and even referred to a secret German contingency plan to help to defeat the very

Boer insurgents that the Pan Germans had idolized. This revelation set in motion a rejection by the Pan Germans of the dynasty and the government. The League had traditionally opposed all democratic reform of Germany's political system, but it now found itself arguing that ultimate authority in national questions should be vested in the nation rather than in the Monarch.²⁵

These challenges to the government posed by nationalist associations demonstrate how easily mass mobilization around nationalist issues might threaten the very legitimacy of the state and monarchy it was meant to reinforce. Since 1871 Germany's governments had repeatedly deployed nationalist rhetoric as a means to achieve greater political unity and social stability. More recently, governments had seen in the nationalist associations a useful tool with which to influence elections and forge useful political coalitions. Yet their mass quality made these organizations increasingly unpredictable allies for the state, and after 1900 they frequently embarrassed governments and even occasionally produced political instability.

Radical forms of nationalism in Germany diverged from state-based nationalism over other divisive issues as well. Decades of statehood had made official forms of nationalism into a generally accepted civic religion in Germany, one whose basic symbols, such as the flag or the monarchy enjoyed nationalist significance thanks to their close association with the state. Not surprisingly, however, given activists' emphasis on the conflict with Slavs in the East, a radical fringe of nationalists parted company with this state-based understanding of nationhood in the 1890s to define the nation and its interests more in ethnic or even racial terms. In this view, not the citizens of the German nation state, but rather a German *Volk* spread among several states formed the national community. For these pan-German ethnic nationalists, 1871 had constituted not an end point—the final unification of a German nation state—but rather a first step toward the ambitious unification of all ethnic Germans in Europe into a vaguely defined continental empire that might someday include much of the Habsburg Monarchy and parts of Russia. This kind of radical ethnic pan-Germanism developed in tandem with a counterpart movement in Habsburg Austria starting in the 1880s. There, the followers of the volatile radical German nationalist and anti-Semitic demagogue Georg von Schönerer had proclaimed their treasonous adherence to the vision of a greater (Protestant) Germany. Schönerer's followers never made up more than a tiny, if vocal minority among German nationalists in Imperial Austria and Schönerer himself was brought down by scandal, imprisonment, and the loss of his noble title.²⁶ Clearly, this pan-German emphasis on culture and ethnicity as the determining factors in nationhood, rather than statehood or citizenship, demanded a radical transformation of Germany's borders and its citizenship laws, aims whose attempted realization could radically destabilize both German society and the European balance of power.

Ironically, however, as radical activists defined Germanness in more geographically expansive terms, they explicated their cultural understanding of Germanness far more narrowly. Even as they claimed national membership for the millions of alleged Germans who lived outside Germany's borders, some pan-Germans sought to strip German citizens who were not ethnic Germans by their exacting standards, including

Polish-speakers and Jews, of their citizenship rights.²⁷ As an idiom of nineteenth-century peasant and artisanal protest, anti-Semitism had often framed local social and economic issues in specifically cultural or religious terms. The Conservative Party's Tivoli Program of 1892, for example, had proclaimed its intention to: 'combat the widely obtruding and decomposing Jewish influence on our popular life' and demanded, 'a Christian authority for the Christian people and Christian teachers for Christian pupils.'²⁸ Yet this invocation of anti-Semitism that rested on the alleged victimization of a Christian population by Jews had little to do with ideas about the German nation as such. Instead, this popular form of anti-Semitism invoked more traditional explanations for the perceived ills of German society in an age of profound economic, social, and cultural transformation. The political appeal of this anti-Semitism—to the minimal extent that it did appeal to voters—rested on the recognizable religious and economic images it conjured.

When factions in the Pan German League rejected the monarchy and the state in the decade before 1914, however, their leaders turned increasingly to a new and decidedly racial form of anti-Semitism, finding in it a coherent worldview on which to found their radical activism.²⁹ If they failed to expand Germany's borders or to change the legal status of Germany's Jews, these radical nationalists could at least impose a racially anti-Semitic definition of nationhood on their own organizations. Their own practices of membership discrimination and boycott may have had few practical effects on German society in 1900, but their insistence on defining the nation ideologically in racial terms and their relentless focus on purifying its membership positioned them for greater influence after the First World War when even the state began to pursue policies that favored a more ethnic definition of nationhood.³⁰

Racially anti-Semitic thinking, while hardly shared by the majority of the population, or even majorities within nationalist associations, nevertheless entered into public debate about citizenship and what it meant to be German, thanks also to Germany's developing overseas colonial empire. When German rule over other peoples came to include the creation of significant settlements in Southwest and East Africa, race became a pressing issue. Settlers themselves increasingly raised practical questions of property ownership in racial terms as a way to assert their interests both against indigenous peoples and against the power of colonial and military administrators. However, when it came to the legal status of children of so-called mixed-race marriages in the colonies, for example, newer racial arguments designed to underwrite German power within colonial societies clashed unexpectedly with traditional gauges of German citizenship based on patrilineal descent.

Both settlers and local colonial administrators increasingly sought to outlaw racially mixed marriages among Germans and to deny claims of citizenship to the offspring of such unions in the early twentieth century.³¹ The courts inside Germany, however, refused to follow this practice, often siding with the German men who sought citizenship status for their descendants of whatever race. This situation posed two different concepts of national citizenship against each other, both based on theories of descent. The new German citizenship law of 1913 made no mention of this racial question, although issues about Germans and race in the colonies had been raised during debates

both in public and in the Reichstag. The law did formalize a right to citizenship based on descent, but it did not explicitly answer the question of whether German men could claim citizenship for their mixed-race descendants. Nevertheless, the debates around colonial practices clearly contributed to the racialization of the concept of German nationhood in both its global and European context among some nationalists.³²

When Germany entered the war in August of 1914, the Kaiser proclaimed that he 'knew no parties, only Germans,' offering an official wartime image of a unified German national community. War soon offered nationalists of many different stripes the opportunity to dream expansively about Germany's future in Europe, but also to delineate just what cultural qualities and characteristics they believed differentiated Germans from their enemies in the West and the East. As the war ground on, however, the extreme sacrifices demanded by the state of its citizens, both at the front and at home, produced a political radicalization of German society, which also found expression in competing visions of the nation. As in the past, however, the question for nationalists was not so much whether Germany was unified, but rather the terms on which this unity should be forged.

During the war, new issues also influenced competing visions of the nation. Women gained increasing public visibility and influence, especially women of the working classes and the *Mittelstand*, with men at the front and children at home who vigorously protested the increasing difficulty of procuring basic foodstuffs. During the war, such women came to demand government aid as a core right of national citizenship, owed them because of their extreme sacrifice to the national community.³³ This link between wartime sacrifice and expanded rights of national citizenship constituted a new way to understand both the national community, and its obligation to its members. Would workers gain recognition of their unions and a role in determining industrial policy in return for their cooperation in the war effort? Would the restrictive suffrage system that elected the Prussian Diet finally be broadened?

Conflict about the meaning of nation also centered on the issue of war aims, fueled by a protracted political debate of the issue in the *Reichstag* in 1917. Should Germany seek an immediate peace with its enemies, or should it continue to seek a victory that would guarantee it territorial expansion and increased global power? In July 1917, in the shadow of the Russian Revolution, a *Reichstag* majority made up of deputies from the SPD, the Catholic Center Party, and the Progressive Liberals passed a so-called peace resolution that demanded a cessation of hostilities that would forego territorial annexation or financial reparations. In direct response, radical nationalist activists founded the German Fatherland Party in Königsberg in September 1917 to lobby for a victorious peace (*Siegfriede*) that would include annexations in western and Eastern Europe, as well as in Africa. 'For the government to carry out a strong *Reichspolitik*,' claimed the party's manifesto, 'it needs a strong instrument. Such an instrument must be a large party resting on the support of a broad majority in the Fatherland.' Seeking to 'mobilize all patriotic forces without respect to political position,' the organizers scoffed at the weak nerves of the *Reichstag* deputies who had passed the peace resolution, claiming that only they reflected the will of the nation.³⁴ With Admiral Tirpitz as its national

chair and civil servant Wolfgang Kapp (future leader of a failed Putsch against the Weimar Republic in 1920) as second in command, the Fatherland Party swiftly gained a remarkable following.

The organizers of the Fatherland party remained purposefully vague about their specific war aims precisely because they, as Tirpitz wrote, worried 'that the average German will become fearful when he hears the words Ireland or Egypt, and our opponents will have an easy time portraying us as wanting to prolong the war.'³⁵ While the party's rapid growth was indeed impressive, Roger Chickering's study of wartime Freiburg demonstrates, not surprisingly, that the new party often created more conflict than unity even among its own supporters. The founding of a local Fatherland Party branch in Freiburg undermined the existing fragile consensus among the other parties on the legitimacy of the war there. 'The city's leading patriots,' writes Chickering, 'had attempted to revivify national solidarity, to recommit loyalties to the great common cause of the fatherland.' Instead, they poisoned the local discourse and so saddled the symbols of national community with their own aggressive political designs that national solidarity strained along its many fault lines.³⁶ One local Catholic politician warned against stirring up the masses in the name of nationalism, arguing, that were 'this [same] kind of agitation [to] be imitated by the Independent Social Democrats . . . we should have revolution in Germany.'³⁷

The eventual end to the war in the West, however, was preceded by significant events in the east that played a critical role in shaping German nationalist attitudes in the period that followed. The collapse of the western front in October 1918 was all the more shocking to most Germans because Germany had recently celebrated an overwhelming victory in the east. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed on 3 March 1918, had substantially changed the map of the East, assigning territory as far East as Rostov on the Don to Germany, and creating German client states in the western regions of the former Russian Empire. Brest-Litovsk stripped Russia of half of its industry and a third of its population, offering hope that massive food supplies would soon reach starving Germans back home. The treaty also underscored the degree to which the border regions to Germany's East had become sites where nationalists might play out fantasies of colonial expansion and radical Germanization. The *Oberost*, an occupied region stretching from the Baltic to northern Poland, served the wartime Hindenburg/Ludendorff regime specifically as the site of such colonial experimentation. As Vejas G. Liulevicius has argued, the *Oberost* command was far more than an occupying regime. It attempted to Germanize land and peoples through wide-ranging policies that rigidly controlled population movement and sought to transform indigenous peoples by subjecting them to cultural Germanization.³⁸

With defeat in the West, and revolution at home, bands of nationalist volunteers led by military veterans, the so-called *Freikorps*, organized both to battle socialists at home and to defend Germany's borders in Silesia, Posen, and in the Baltic region of the *Oberost* Command. In this latter goal their efforts were reinforced by the allies' desire to use the *Freikorps* as a temporary bulwark against the Bolsheviks whose forces were intent on recapturing the Baltic region for Russia. The dual efforts of the *Freikorps* as

they saw it—to defend Germany from Slavs in the East and Communists at home—often became mutually constitutive in their nationalist propaganda. In the Baltic, *Freikorps* units sought to hold ‘Slavic or Jewish Bolshevism’ at bay, and to protect the German national community from incurring this ideological ‘infection.’³⁹ Increasingly during the war, right-wing nationalists had already attempted to write Jews out of the national community, baselessly accusing them, for example, of avoiding military service or open treachery.⁴⁰ After the Russian Revolution many German and Russian nationalists openly equated Bolshevism with Jews, arguing that a rising tide of foreign Jewish influence in German society had produced the German Revolution in 1918–1919. This concept of political ideological infection conveyed an increasingly racial and medicalized construction of national differences in the East, based in part, as Paul Weindling has eloquently argued, on wartime and postwar efforts to limit immigration, seeing in it a major cause of the spread of infectious diseases in Germany.⁴¹

Yet another indirect legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the popularization of conspiracy theories to explain Germany’s sudden defeat in the West. Some believed that since the war had largely been fought on foreign territory, and because Germany and its allies had won a great victory against Russia, the German military could not actually have been defeated in the field, a presumption that military leaders themselves and especially Ludendorff helped to promote. The collapse, they believed, must have resulted from betrayal by traitorous foreign elements (generally Jews and Communists) on the home front.

During this violent and confusing period after the end of the war, a German National Assembly met at Weimar from February to August 1919 to draw up a constitution for the new Republican Germany. This liberal document declared that power emanated from the people, although in earlier drafts deputies had debated whether power should emanate from the German people. This statement did little to settle the issue of membership within the national community and national community became an even more important part of general political thinking and rhetoric following the wartime defeat. Under the new Republic almost every political party constantly reminded Germans in one way or another of what was called their humiliation—indeed their national martyrdom—at the hands of their enemies. The inexplicable defeat along with Germany’s unfair treatment by the victors at the Paris Peace Settlement remained central to different nationalist complaints in the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, German nationalists also began to popularize a very different concept of German national community than the state-oriented one that had dominated most thinking under the *Kaiserreich*. By eliding Germany’s political humiliation with the dismemberment of its ally Austria-Hungary, German nationalists implied that the ethnic Germans who had formerly been citizens of Austria-Hungary somehow shared the same relationship to the German state, as did the former German citizens who now lived under Polish, Belgian, French, or Danish rule. The equivalence nationalists asserted between these very different populations and their experiences popularized the kind of ethnic understanding of German nationhood that some Pan Germans had touted before the

war, suggesting that all of these people suffered similar fates as victims, and that all ultimately belonged to the German nation state.

This new vision effectively answered the allies' promotion of a peace settlement allegedly founded on democratic principles that favored the self-determination of nations. Some on the left understood German claims to more territory and people in terms of a republican vision of nationhood that hearkened back to *grossdeutsch* traditions first articulated in 1848.⁴² Like German nationalists on the right, they argued that the Paris Settlements had ignored democratic principles when they placed millions of German speakers under the rule of Polish or Czech nationalists. As with the allies' justifications of the settlement, this argument too rested on questionable logic, presuming as it did that the common use of the German language somehow made these different German-speaking groups in Central Europe members of a single national community. German nationalists increasingly referred to such populations—ranging in size from 6 million Germans in Austria or 3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia to smaller enclaves of German speakers in Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia—as *Streudeutsche* (literally 'scattered Germans') or *Sprachinsel* ('language island') Germans.⁴³ The use of such terms implied that the allies had forcibly dispersed the German national community among its hostile neighbor states, thereby creating a German diaspora of minority communities.

The idea of a German diaspora—of German populations scattered among alien rulers—had never been particularly popular before the war, except among radical fringe elements in Germany and Imperial Austria. It had never carried much weight because before 1918 most of the populations in question had been citizens of Germany's close ally, Austria-Hungary. Perceptions of profound religious, regional, and cultural differences also meant that most of the peoples in question did not view themselves as potential citizens of Germany. Even in Austria or Bohemia many nationalists saw themselves as only distantly related to Germans in Germany, and few favored joining the Reich except perhaps in a loose federal arrangement. Some community leaders in these states were happy to receive financial or moral support from Germany, but this did not make them future citizens of Germany or even beholden to Germany's interests.

Many nationalists in Weimar Germany, however, claimed these Germans for their nation state, and increasingly asserted Germany's right to protect and foster their cultural survival. This consideration alone—the ability to pose as protector of orphan *Streudeutsche* communities in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, or Romania—even justified Germany's entry into the despised League of Nations for nationalists who otherwise abhorred the institution. It also underlay the logic of Gustav Stresemann's foreign policy initiatives through the 1920s that sought accommodation in the West, while leaving border questions in the East open. Should the map of Europe be redrawn at a later date, many nationalists also believed that the continued existence of strong German enclaves across the border in Poland, for example, would help to justify territorial revision in Germany's favor. It was therefore critical to support the continued existence of those minorities and to prevent them from emigrating to Germany. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Weimar Germany became for a time the

acknowledged champion of the rights of European minorities, and it frequently sponsored minority petitions to the League.⁴⁴

Forced decolonization in Africa and Asia after the war also produced a tendency among nationalists to define their nation in cultural, rather than political terms, and to re-imagine German's global role in terms closer to home. In the past, the exercise of political power over territories in Africa and Asia had defined Germany's relationship to its colonies. With Germany's colonies parceled out to the victors, however, post-war nationalists turned increasingly to culture as the measure of a territory's German identity. Some argued, for example, that the presence of German cultural practices in agriculture, husbandry, schooling, in short in all aspects of life, meant that Southwest Africa remained fundamentally German in character, even if it was now ruled by Britain.⁴⁵ More frequently, however, nationalist activists applied these cultural arguments to claim territories and populations in Eastern Europe for Germany. In the fall of 1918 Gustav Stresemann had written that: 'Perhaps in the future Germany will turn rather more to the east and we will find there some substitute for what we will not be able to obtain for the time being in competition overseas.'⁴⁶ Many nationalist organizations within Germany followed this new colonial logic, taking up so-called *Volkstumsarbeit*, or cultural work on Germany's eastern frontiers, in order to recover or protect German culture from the alleged threat of denationalization. *Volkstumsarbeit* became a particularly important form of activism in communities where German speakers on either side of the new frontier constituted a local minority of the population. In such places, often rural villages, activists distributed periodicals, founded small libraries, built Kindergartens, schools, and daycare facilities, and sought to create employment, job education, or apprenticeships for German youth. They also tried to create a greater sense of national community among locals by involving them together in holiday rituals or creating associations to promote local music, dance, or crafts.⁴⁷

But, what were the signs of a local German cultural presence in the East? In theory, they ranged from exacting domestic habits, the production of tasteful (not kitschy or Slavic) domestic crafts or the ability to transform unfriendly rural landscapes into productive gardens. Building on nineteenth-century tropes that had made German culture recognizable in the whiteness of a German woman's linens or the 'laughing meadows and flourishing fields [German farmers] have wrested from a wild nature,' (as opposed to the sordid mess—*polnische Wirtschaft*—they claimed characterized the fields of their Slavic neighbors), German nationalists sounded the alarm. Nationalists warned the public that Germans everywhere in the East found themselves in mortal danger of losing their cultural distinctiveness to the hostile nationalization policies of enemy nation states.⁴⁸ They researched histories (*Ostforschung*) that documented and justified a German presence in the East, wrote literature that praised the historic accomplishments of German colonists there, drew maps that constantly reminded the public of the Eastern territories where German culture might be found, and produced tourist literature that extolled the cultural German qualities of Eastern destinations.⁴⁹ Nationalists constantly reminded their readers in Germany that, as Bohemian poet Wilhelm Pleyer's 1932 poetry collection '*Deutschland ist größer!*'

(Germany is bigger!) suggested, there was more to the German nation than just the people who lived within the borders enforced by the victors at Versailles. The map on the cover of Pleyer's poetry volume served as a typical graphic example of these claims. Here, both the lost territories (Alsace Lorraine, Eupen-Malmedy, Schleswig, Danzig, Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor, and Memel) were shaded in the same tone as were all of Austria and the allegedly German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Baltics. Together these regions constituted the true and legitimate territorial span of the German nation.⁵⁰

Both the republican government and later the Nazi regime subsidized nationalist cultural organizations that claimed to support ethnic German communities in the borderlands, starting in 1920–1921 when the radical Pan German League—now renamed the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* (VDA)—and the new *Deutscher Schutzbund für das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum* mobilized voters for plebiscites in East and West Prussia, and in Silesia.⁵¹ There is less evidence that German-speaking inhabitants of these frontier regions necessarily saw themselves as threatened in a specifically national sense. In Upper Silesia, for example, the democratization of Prussia after the revolution of 1918, the increased influence of the Catholic Center Party in Germany, and a plebiscite regime that guaranteed the region meaningful local autonomy, helped to produce a surprise majority vote for Germany in several Polish-speaking districts. Although activists interpreted this outcome as something of a victory for German nationalism, local studies of the region demonstrate that in 1921 many voters believed that inclusion in Germany might better protect the region's religious, cultural, and economic interests. Despite the best efforts of German and Polish nationalists (and their media) to paint the region as a hotbed of nationalist unrest after the plebiscite, most Silesians, whatever languages they might speak, remained indifferent to the blandishments of the more radical nationalists on either side. This did not mean that they paid no attention to what the nationalists said and did. Instead, the decisions of Silesians' to support one nationalist side against the other, or indeed to support neither side, often rested on their evaluations of their particular interests in a given situation and not, as the nationalists would have wished, on the basis of a long-term nationalist commitment that overrode all other considerations.⁵²

In the early years of the economic depression, both government and bourgeois Germans turned increasingly to nationalist commitment as the solution for reviving Germany's fortunes. Although the Reich government had already proposed special borderland economic aid for East Prussia in 1926, with the onset of economic depression, nationalists elsewhere in Germany increasingly sought such funds for their own regions, which they now designated as threatened borderlands. Regional and local authorities in Prussia, Saxony, and even in Bavaria, invoked nationalist fears of creeping Slavization in their bids for funding from the central government. Their applications to subsidize public works projects or to expand welfare or tourism facilities increasingly invoked threats of Slavic infiltration and German denationalization. In 1930 Reich legislation designed specifically to improve conditions along Germany's border with Poland called for the greater protection of Germany's threatened border

areas in general. Almost immediately Bavaria and Saxony invoked the wording of this law to apply for similar borderland funds to protect German culture along their frontiers with Czechoslovakia.⁵³

A consensus in German bourgeois circles about the importance of nationalism as somehow above the polarized and sordid political conflicts of the day eventually helped the Nazi party to build an impressive electoral constituency in the 1930s. Before the onset of the depression, Germany's diverse and traditionally nationalist middle-classes frequently viewed Nazism with mistrust and concern. The party's extreme nationalist rhetoric may have pleased such voters, but its socially radical image usually did not. And on social issues the Nazi's uncompromising rhetoric could sound dangerously revolutionary and sometimes indistinguishable from that of the hated Communists. The Nazi party was only one of several whose campaign rhetoric promised national regeneration through the pursuit of ultra-nationalist foreign policies. Nevertheless, as economic conditions deteriorated from 1930 to 1932, many came to see the Nazi's revolutionary edge in a more positive light. While many bourgeois Germans had viewed the Nazi SA storm troopers as dangerous rowdies in the 1920s, by 1930 they often saw in them the only force willing to battle the Communists and Socialists, in the streets if necessary. As regional and national Nazi vote totals soared between 1928 and 1932, the Party also transformed its rhetoric to feature even more of a unifying nationalist patriotism and a celebration of the military. In this way the Nazis hoped to add voters who feared the possibility of communist revolution, who resented the Weimar Republic's social egalitarianism, and who longed for a revival of German national greatness.

The electoral success of the Nazis in 1932 should not blind us to the ideological differences that, nevertheless, still separated them from more traditionalist nationalists whose parties they defeated. The Nazi vote that reached a high of 37% in the July parliamentary elections did not necessarily reflect an unbridled enthusiasm even among radical German nationalists for the Nazi party program as much as it reflected an exhausted rejection of an impotent political establishment largely incapable of pursuing the nationalist interests of its voters.⁵⁴ An older organization like the Pan German League, whose radicalism was rooted in the Wilhelmine period and that had survived the First World War, had not engaged in the new street politics at which the Nazis excelled. Moreover, despite their recourse to racial anti-Semitism, the Pan Germans had traditionally defined German culture and national identity specifically in terms of *Bildung* or academic education and cultural achievement. It was, after all, this traditionally German quality that gave Germans a right to colonize others, and that entitled educated men to lead the nationalist movement. Both in *Mein Kampf* and in countless public pronouncements, however, Hitler openly rejected this link between *Bildung* and national leadership, often demonstrating contempt for precisely the class of men that had led the radical nationalists before the war.⁵⁵ The focus on racial struggle produced a socially leveling quality in Nazi ideology that recognized no traditional distinctions of cultural or class status within the national community. This potential egalitarianism, which offered countless opportunities for social

advancement to people who in earlier nationalist associations would have had to defer to their social betters, made Nazism worrisome to more traditional nationalists. By 1932, however, many of these more traditional German nationalists nevertheless voted for the Nazis, hoping that they would crush the threat of communism for good, replace class conflict with national unity, and restore Germany's rightful position in international affairs.

Once in power, the new regime justified these hopes immediately, moving swiftly and harshly against its political opponents on the left and using an aggressive nationalist rhetoric of unity to justify almost every other policy. In particular, the Nazis made the realization of *Volksgemeinschaft* or national community their explicit goal. Although the term *Volksgemeinschaft* can be translated to mean a 'people's community,' the regime made no secret of its view that the people in question was a racially defined German nation. The Nazis characterized the implementation of this vision as a return to an earlier, traditional social unity that allegedly predated the German Revolution of 1918 and the Weimar Republic. In its outlines, however, this *Volksgemeinschaft* symbolized a radical departure from earlier forms of national community. Members of this community, it was claimed, would relate to each other primarily in terms of a shared racial identity and not in terms of their differing professions, geographic regions, or confessions. This unity would replace a republican order that had promoted unhealthy social divisions and an artificial class conflict among Germans.

The Nazis swiftly altered many elements of traditional administrative, institutional, and legal practice to help to produce—or according to many nationalists, to revive—the national community. Domestically, this meant the abandonment of the legal *Rechtsstaat* and an outright manipulation of law and the judiciary to favor the interests of the national community against those it defined as outsiders. The proclamation of the Nuremberg laws in 1935 explicitly outlined a new racial standard for citizenship that defined just who constituted the nation and who was now an outsider. The racial definition of citizenship and nation also strengthened the view that Germany's legitimate foreign policy interests included the well being of Germans elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. In the eyes of the Reich, they too were members of the nation and, as such, should be considered potential citizens of Germany. Moreover, some nationalists asserted that the territories these Germans inhabited could also legitimately be claimed for the German state.

If the domestic promises of national renewal—of a true *Volksgemeinschaft*—rested on what appeared to be an egalitarian vision of racial citizenship, they nevertheless encouraged professional Germans to hope that the new order would counter the threat of democratization they had experienced under the hated Republic. Many white-collar professionals, for example, hoped that the new regime would limit access to their professions and restore to them a degree of social privilege and respect that they believed they had lost under the Republic. At the same time, however, the regime also promised a greater measure of respect and nationalist privilege to racial Germans of all classes, combining vigorous propaganda with its racial policies to navigate the potential contradictions lodged in these varied promises. All of this produced an impression

among much of the public that the regime was, indeed, changing the German national community by restoring lost privileges to legitimate Germans, while removing Jews and other non-desirables from the national economy.

The racial concept of national community turned out to be flexible in practice. Because structurally the regime fostered an unregulated competition among its many agencies and institutions, activists in different sectors of the regime could simultaneously pursue competing initiatives, while using nationalist ideology to justify their particular ends. In terms of policing, the regime publicized the first concentration camps widely as sites where political enemies (generally Communists) were allegedly subjected to political re-education. A stay at such a camp should remind Germans of their loyalties and duties to the nation, often by reacquainting them with the values of hard physical labor. After 1933–1934 and the decline of political opposition to the regime, the inmate populations dwindled considerably. A few years later, however, the camps revived again, this time by detaining people the regime labeled in racial terms as asocials, rather than in political terms: repeat criminal offenders, the homeless, addicts, homosexuals. These were all people who it was assumed regularly violated social norms for reasons of heredity. The regime and its opportunistic supporters increasingly defined such marginal populations in racist and eugenic terms that excluded their possible re-education and made their banishment to the camps permanent, rather than temporary in nature for the protection of the nation.⁵⁶

The increasing use of racial reasoning to explain what was considered deviant social behavior in German society also produced potential contradictions in the ongoing definition of national community. If heredity explained chronic social deviance in an individual, then to protect its health, the nation must prevent those individuals from reproducing. Eugenic practices—especially forced sterilization—became a standard means to accomplish this attempt to breed certain threatening characteristics out of the community. The logic behind such policies rested on an unrecognized yet typical ideological contradiction frequently found in nationalism that balances awkwardly between assertions of superiority, on the one hand, and fears about vulnerability and victimization, on the other. Just as nineteenth-century anti-Semitism had limited the numbers of people one could count as Germans at the very time when activists sought to increase the number of Germans in frontier regions, for example, so too did this turn to eugenic policies—from sterilization to euthanasia—contradict the Nazi attempts through other policies (marriage loans) to increase the size of the German population.⁵⁷

The centrality of a race to the national community produced myriad professional opportunities for many Germans, since it demanded both new experts qualified to diagnose hereditary qualities that made people asocial, as well as a growing bureaucracy required to police racially dangerous asocials. However, whether the majority of Germans shared such extreme racial beliefs about the national community is doubtful. Peter Fritzsche has recently argued that at the very least, Nazi pronouncements and policies forced average Germans to engage with concepts of race and nation in daily life situations, whether or not race held any significance for them personally. As citizens of a racial state, most Germans, for example, found it necessary at some point to construct

family trees to confirm their Aryan identity (and their suitability for marriage).⁵⁸ Others encountered race in the context of local economic boycotts, signs banishing Jews from using public accommodations, in Nazi media, or in the open violence of the November pogrom in 1938.

Many bourgeois and politically conservative German groups praised the new regime—and the new *Volksgemeinschaft*; they appreciated order in the streets, the disappearance of the Communists, and the frequent nationalist rituals. Many more Germans remembered the period 1933-1939 in positive terms.⁵⁹ The regime did, however, make greater demands on some citizens than on others in its efforts to realize national community. Formerly Socialist, Communist working-class or unemployed Germans often had little choice, but sullenly to accept the regime. Although Nazi propaganda suggests that the regime sought constantly to mobilize Germans for nationalist goals in their daily lives, the evidence shows that the regime aimed more to demobilize those social groups least likely to accept Nazi rule. Nazi programs, such as the German Labor Front's 'Strength Through Joy,' attempted to co-opt working-class Germans through consumer oriented policies that would both make them more effective workers and ensure the regime a minimum of cooperation among the populations most likely to resent Nazi rule. The 'Strength Through Joy' programs created opportunities for tourism and travel for workers who had little access to leisure travel of any kind, allowing them a chance to experience their place in the larger national community personally by getting to know other parts of Germany. A select few workers even gained the chance to travel abroad on cruises, often to destinations where they might experience Germany's global racial superiority for themselves.⁶⁰

Nazi foreign policy victories in the 1930s, from the return of the Saar to Germany (1935) to the remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936), offered German nationalists the perception of a steady revision of the unfair terms of the 1919 treaties. For many jubilant nationalists these victories presaged potential future border revisions and the annexation of more of Europe's Germans to Germany. Despite some fears about the possible outbreak of war, Germans welcomed *Anschluss* with Austria and annexation of the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia (1938). These victories could be understood in traditional German nationalist terms as redressing iniquities of the 1919 settlement and restoring Germany's position in Europe, as could war against Poland, and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. However, most German nationalists did not envision world conquest on the global scale that Hitler envisioned it. They were, in a sense, far less imaginative and ambitious than were the Nazis and far more focused on redressing the injustices of 1919 through specific territorial revision. Hitler's conception of empire was also rooted in German nationalist visions largely inherited from the nineteenth century, and based on ideologies about the East that dated at least to the Revolutions of 1848. However, in Hitler's view territorial revision merely constituted a minor prelude to achieving control over vast territories and resources in Eastern Europe that would enable Germany not simply to unite all Germans inside a national and continental empire, but also to become the world's leading imperial power.⁶¹

With the outbreak of war in 1939, and especially with the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Nazi ambitions turned out to be far more difficult to realize than expected, thanks largely to Germany's lack of preparedness to fight a long war on several fronts. Problems with the pursuit of the war also derived from the regime's expenditure of valuable resources on ambitious nationalist population politics: first, the immediate resettlement of so-called ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) in newly acquired Polish territories, and later the extermination of Europe's Jews. Both of these policies sought to realize different aspects of the broader Nazi vision of national community, and the importance assigned by Hitler to both policies shaped occupation practices in the East, and made prosecution of total war significantly more difficult from the standpoint of the military.

As with their rule over German society, the Nazis' wartime command structures introduced several competing sites of authority (the SS, the *Wehrmacht*, the individual *Gauleiter* or provincial chiefs in the East, the East Ministry in Berlin, the various institutions of experts on Eastern matters). The infighting among these authorities produced very different approaches to officially shared goals, such as the Germanization of annexed territory or the exploitation of local Slav populations. All of them justified their policies and their use of scarce resources in terms of the racial ideology of nationhood, and all produced profoundly contradictory administrative practices.⁶²

Although Nazi administrators arrived in the Sudetenland and later in the Protectorate of Bohemia Moravia seeking to restore German national power and to destroy the Czech nation, they soon modified their original intentions. Nazi racial policy when applied to Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, for example, looked very different indeed from its application to Poles or Ukrainians.⁶³ In the newly annexed *Reichsgau* Sudetenland, deliverance by the Reich from Czech oppression and union with the larger German national community produced ambivalence and uncertainty among many German speakers. While their new Nazi rulers attempted to win over local Germans (and Germanizable Czech speakers) with generous funding for municipal projects, schools, and welfare payments, Sudetenland Germans were in no mood to sacrifice for their new homeland by serving in the *Wehrmacht*, or paying higher German prices for essential goods and services. German nationalists in the Sudetenland had long complained that Czechs dominated the civil service and school teaching positions. This, they believed, would not change if German men left for the front or to labor in Germany. Sudeten Germans also wanted the Nazis to treat Czechs with much greater severity, something their new rulers were loath to do, since they valued the highly-skilled industrial Czech labor force. The resulting resentments produced regional sentiments easily capable of undermining the feelings of national community that the Nazis sought to realize. It also, ironically, meant that the Nazis were willing to tolerate a certain amount of Czech nationalism, as long as it was not directed against the Reich.⁶⁴

In Poland, meanwhile, a very different situation obtained. In the annexed regions, Himmler sought to remove Polish and Jewish populations to the East, dumping them in the General Government territory with no regard to food supplies, overcrowding, or medical conditions. Ideally, after the systematic destruction of the Polish

leadership—the intelligentsia and the political classes—the surviving Poles would serve somehow as a flexible labor supply. Local and regional Nazi administrators sought to Germanize the territories under their control using varying strategies. In Poland the Nazis imposed a German *Volksliste* that divided potential Germans in the region into hierarchic categories with different degrees of privilege, depending ostensibly on their nationalist credentials, but often enough on their political reliability. In order to realize its vision of nationhood that united all ethnic Germans, the regime also drew up agreements with the Soviet Union to resettle ethnic Germans from Bukovina, Volhynia, and the Baltics (all newly annexed by the USSR) in the annexed regions of Poland.

Although Himmler believed that the resettlement process could be accomplished swiftly; in fact, most of the ethnic Germans who trekked westward to build a new life in the Reich found themselves living in camps for the duration of the war. To keep them docile in the camps, where their frustrated expectations of land produced growing complaints, the regime withheld full citizenship from the settlers until after the war, when their record of politically loyal behavior would confirm their membership in the national community. Here, as in the late nineteenth century or in the 1920s, expectations among nationalists in Germany about the racial and national characteristics that allegedly separated Slavs and Germans on the borderlands produced confusion and uncertainty when activists encountered real ethnic Germans in the occupied territories.⁶⁵ Young, often female nationalist activists who were sent during the war to do *Volkstumsarbeit* or welfare work in the newly-annexed territories in the East, anticipated that they would play an important role in a nationalist drama that pitted German civilization against Slavic chaos on the frontier. What they actually encountered, however, were profoundly ambivalent situations that confounded their expectations about national community. Among the local Germans, as well as the *Volksdeutsche* settlers, young activists might encounter bilingualism, strong Catholic loyalties, a deplorably low degree of civilization, and a profound indifference to the National Socialist revolution—much less to the concept of nation. Female volunteers in the Wartheland assigned to help the SS clear out Polish families from their farms and replace them with *Volksdeutsche* families often noticed that settlers from Volhynia often spoke better Polish than German. The ethnic German settlers appeared to share more with local Polish speakers than they did with the middle-class nationalist activists from Germany.⁶⁶ In regions occupied by Germany, but neither annexed nor slated for resettlement, the concept of ethnic German became even more elastic. From the Baltics to the Ukraine it was increasingly those who were most fully Nazified and who collaborated most enthusiastically with the invader, who might earn the coveted status of *Volksdeutsche*. Anyone who sought ethnic German status to gain local privileges needed to demonstrate his Germanness palpably, usually by inflicting violence on his Jewish neighbors or at least betraying them to the Nazi occupiers.⁶⁷

In the spring of 1945, as the Third Reich finally collapsed, German speakers were on the move across Eastern Europe, often fleeing the Red Army or retribution from local partisans. Thanks to policies of imperial expansion pursued by the Nazi regime, those who had been resettled by the Nazis also found themselves again forced to abandon

their homes and to flee to the West. Less than a century after the founding of a German nation state, the proponents of the most radical form of German nationalism had gained the power to convert their ambitious visions into practice. With the full force of the state behind them, they had driven Europe and their own society into catastrophe, thanks in large part to their insistence on bending the rule of law to the ideological demands of their nationalism. Whether it was in the eugenic policies they applied to members of the nation or in the genocidal policies with which they targeted its alleged enemies like the Jews, the Nazis completely abandoned the rule of law for an order that instead made nation (as their functionaries defined it) into the highest good.

The dynamics of an expansionist nationalism that sought ever more ways to purify the national community, on the one hand, and ever more territorial acquisitions on the other, had in part produced this catastrophe. It was the particularly nationalist components of these aggressive policies that shaped both their imperial and genocidal characters. However, was *German* nationalism to blame for the catastrophes brought about by Nazism? How exceptional was German nationalism? In fact, during this period German nationalism looks remarkably similar to other forms of nationalism in Europe, even taking into account the specificities of the German case. Racialized forms of nationalism could be found across Europe, from Ireland to Romania. In June 1932, for example, a Polish nationalist Silesian newspaper welcomed the strict separation of the races promised by the Nazis, 'in the interest of the purity of both cultures.' Polish activists believed that separation would finally end the national indifference that characterized many Poles in the region.⁶⁸ Other elements of German nationalism, such as the dynamic sense of victimization German nationalists had cultivated after 1918 or the assertion that the peace had unjustly consigned co-nationals to the oppression of hostile neighbors, constituted critical components of Hungarian and Italian nationalism as well. However, perhaps the most important characteristic shared by German nationalism with its European counterparts was its tendency to conceive of the national community in cultural/ethnic, rather than in political terms, even in societies traditionally associated with more civic forms of nationalism. In recent years scholars have effectively demolished the older dichotomous view—itsself a product of the wars of the 20th century—that contrasted a western civic nationalism with an eastern ethnic nationalism. Wherever we encounter it in mid-twentieth-century Europe, nationalism rested on the idea of a prior national community defined by shared culture if not ethnicity, whether in Germany, France, Hungary, or Serbia. It was, after all, the French in 1918 who found it necessary to engage in expulsions from Alsace, not on the basis of loyalty or even language use, but on the basis of descent. The nationalist impulse to realize this kind of nation in practice created all manner of dangerously oppressive practices across Europe in the twentieth century.⁶⁹

If the Nazis were highly nationalistic, the character and murderousness of their particular and extreme vision of national community were also no more German than were other, competing visions of the German nation. This is not to say that there is or was a good nationalism and a bad nationalism, the way some scholars have argued since the 1950s.⁷⁰ All twentieth-century nationalisms contain by definition at least the

seeds of what the Nazi variety produced, from the concentration camp to more benign institutions like the flag or the anthem. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt's insightful observation from over a half century ago, the nationalization of European society that produced national minorities and stateless people in significant numbers after the First World War largely succeeded in replacing the rights of man with the rights of nations.⁷¹ This development did not have to produce genocide or ethnic cleansing, but it certainly made those outcomes in Germany and elsewhere all the more possible.

NOTES

1. For the classic statement of this argument, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire 1871–1918*, trans. Kim Traynor (Dover NH: Berg Publishers, 1985). For the argument with greater detail and force, focused on social imperialism, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1849–1914*, vol. 3 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995), 1138–1140.
2. Nikolaus Buschmann, 'Between the Federative Nation and the National State: Public Perceptions of the Foundation of the German Empire in Southern Germany and Austria,' in Laurence Cole (ed.), *Different Paths to the Nation. Regional and National Identities in Central Europe and Italy 1830–1870* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 157–179.
3. Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict. Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 33.
4. Smith, *German Nationalism*, 33.
5. For a brief summary of the literature on the Kulturkampf, see Christopher Clark, 'Religion and Confessional Conflict,' in James Retallack (ed.), *Imperial Germany 1871–1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83–105.
6. Michael B. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Smith, *German Nationalism*, 40, 54–55.
7. This charge ignored the liberal constitutional arrangements that characterized both Austrian and Hungarian systems following the 1867 Compromise. Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries. Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 117–143.
8. Erwin Fink, 'Symbolic Representations of the Nation: Baden, Bavaria, and Saxony, c. 1860–80,' in Cole (ed.), *Different Paths to the Nation*, 200–219, especially pp. 202–208.
9. Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as Local Metaphor. Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), especially pp. 52–93.
10. Smith, *German Nationalism*, 118. See also pp. 140–156 for further examples of conflicts between the state and more radical nationalists.
11. The German census for 1900 reported the following figures for mother tongue: 92.05% German, 5.48% Polish, 0.38% French, 0.25% Danish, 0.19% Lithuanian, 0.18% Kashubian, 0.16% Sorb, 0.14% Dutch. From *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band 150: Die Volkszählung*

- am 1. Dezember 1900 im Deutschen Reich (Berlin: Verlag für Sozialpolitik, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1903).
12. At least twenty-three districts in Posen, Silesia, and West Prussia counted over 80% Polish speakers, and in another thirty districts the percentage of Polish speakers was 50–80%. From *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band 150*.
 13. The nationalists' identification of Poles with Catholicism did not fully reflect social and cultural realities, since German-speaking Catholics and Polish-speaking Protestants could be found in Germany's Eastern territories. James Bjork, *Neither German Nor Pole. Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 13–14; Smith, *German Nationalism*, 170–191.
 14. Richard Timms, *Germanizing Prussian Poland: The H-K-T Society and the Struggle for the Eastern Marches in the German Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941); Sabine Grabowsky, *Deutscher und polnischer Nationalismus: Der deutsche Ostmarken-Verein und die polnische Straz 1894–1914* (Marburg: Verlag Herder Institut, 1998); William Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
 15. James Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*.
 16. The Navy League was founded in part by initiatives from within the Government's Naval Office. For membership statistics for the Society for the Eastern Marches, the Navy League, the Pan German League, the Colonial Society, and the Society for Germanism Abroad; see Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 366–367.
 17. Although membership numbers fluctuated considerably in its first decade of existence, by 1906 the organization had doubled its membership to 40,500 and in 1914 the number stood at 54,000. Eley, *Reshaping the German Right*, 366–367.
 18. On the HKT Association, see Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 1849–1914, vol. 3, 1075–1076.
 19. Caitlin Murdock, *Changing Places. Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870–1946* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), especially 68–76. In 1909, for example, the *Alldeutsche Blätter* complained bitterly that mail from Bohemia was being sent to Dresden and Zwickau allegedly addressed to 'Drazd'an'y' and 'Cvikava.'
 20. The Pan Germans also supported the imposition of strict limits on the size of landed estates, a position that did not endear them to Conservatives in the region. Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the Pan German League, 1886–1914* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 280.
 21. Thomas Serrier, *Provinz Posen, Ostmark, Wielkopolska. Eine Grenzregion zwischen Deutschen und Polen 1848–1914* (Marburg: Verlag Herder Institut, 2005), 53. See also Serrier, 'Deutsche Kulturarbeit in der Ostmark. Der Mythos vom deutschen Vorrang und die Grenzproblematik in der Provinz Posen (1871–1914)' in Michael G. Müller and Rolf Petri (eds), *Die Nationalisierung von Grenzen. Zur Konstruktion nationaler Identität in sprachlich gemischten Grenzregionen* (Marburg: Verlag Herder Institut, 2002), 13–34.
 22. The locus classicus of this position was Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire 1871–1918*, 83–88. In his later *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 3, 942–945, 1074, he writes, however, of the nationalism of Imperial Germany as a 'political religion,' and of 'a new opposition from the right' with respect to the Pan-German League. Conversely, he insists that *Welt-politik* had 'primarily domestic motives' (p. 1140).
 23. Eley, *Reshaping the German Right*; Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*.

24. Eley, *Reshaping the German Right*, especially 267–290.
25. Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*, 213–223.
26. Andrew Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools. Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan Germanism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Lothar Höbelt, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler, Die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882–1918* (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1993).
27. By rejecting Jews from the nation in both Germany and Imperial Austria, radical German nationalists rejected people who in linguistically mixed regions often provided key support to Germans in the census and in local elections.
28. Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, rev. edn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 112.
29. Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*, 232–245; James Retallack, *The German Right 1860–1920. Political Limits of the Authoritarian Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 273–324.
30. Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
31. Lora Wildenthal, 'Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire,' in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 263–283.
32. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), especially 114–137; Howard Sargent, 'Diasporic Citizens. Germans Abroad in the Framing of German Citizenship Law,' in Krista O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, Nancy Reagin (eds), *The Heimat Abroad. The Boundaries of Germanness* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005) 17–39; Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschliessen*; Markus Lang, *Grundkonzeption und Entwicklung des deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Standesamtswesen, 1990).
33. Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning. Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
34. 'Aufruf der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei' reproduced in Heinz Hagenlücke, *Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. Die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaiserreichs* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1997). On the founding of the party, 143–163.
35. Quoted in Hagenlücke, *Deutsche Vaterlandspartei*, 212–213.
36. Roger Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany. Freiburg, 1914–1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
37. Chickering, *Freiburg*, 537. The local efforts of the Fatherland Party also appear inadvertently to have helped the local SPD to remain united.
38. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front. Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Liulevicius argues that the experience of occupation in the East prepared the attitudes that underlay Nazi colonial efforts there during the Second World War. Isabel Hull cautions that the *Oberost* regime, while brutal, was more the product of traditional German military logic than of nationalist-völkisch ideology. Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 248.
39. Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), especially chapter 2; Hagen Schulze, *Freikorps*

- und Republik, 1918–1920 (Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt, 1969); Hagen Schulze, 'Der Oststaatplan 1919,' *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte* 18, no. 2 (1970), especially 123–130.
40. On the Jewish census, Sven Oliver Müller, *Die Nation als Waffe und als Vorstellung: Nationalismus in Deutschland und Großbritannien im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 144.
 41. Liulevicius, *War Land*, especially 227–246; Robert Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918–1923* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1953); Paul Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
 42. Claudia Klemm, *Erinnert—umstritten—gefeiert: Die Revolution von 1848/49 in der deutschen Gedenkkultur* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2007); Erin Hochman, 'Staging the Nation, Staging Democracy: The Politics of Commemoration in Germany and Austria 1918–1933/34' (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2010); Eric Bryden, 'In Search of Founding Fathers: Republican Historical Narratives in Weimar Germany' (PhD dissertation, University of California Davis, 2008); Robert Gerwarth, 'The Past in Weimar History,' *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 1 (2006), 1–22.
 43. A leading example from the enormous literature that promoted this idea is Erwin Barta and Karl Bell, *Geschichte der Schutzarbeit am deutschen Volkstum* (Dresden: Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, 1930).
 44. Carol Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: the Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
 45. Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 176–178.
 46. Jonathan Wright, *Gustav Stresemann, Weimar's Greatest Statesman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 107; quoted in Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 148.
 47. Elizabeth Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East. Agents and Witnesses of Germanization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 28–43.
 48. Erich Gierach, quoted in David Blackbourn's insightful essay, 'The Garden of our Hearts: Landscape, Nature, and Local Identity in the German East,' in David Blackbourn and James Retallack, *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place. German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 149–164.
 49. Liulevicius, *German Myth*; Michael Fahlbusch, *Wissenschaft im Dienst der nationalsozialistischen Politik? Die 'Volksdeutschen Forschungsgemeinschaften' von 1931–1945* (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1999); Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (London: Pan, 2002); Nancy Reagin, *Sweeping the German Nation: Domesticity and National Identity in Germany, 1870–1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East*.
 50. Wilhelm Pleyer, *Deutschland ist größer! Gedichte eines Grenzlanddeutschen*, 2nd edn (Weimar: Alexander Duncker Verlag, 1932). On inter-war nationalist cartography, Henrik Herb, *Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Kristin Kopp, 'Cartographic Claims: Colonial Mappings of Poland in German Territorial Revisionism' in Gail Finney (ed.), *Visual Culture in Twentieth-Century Germany: Text as Spectacle* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2006) 199–213.
 51. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border*, chapter 2.

52. Bjork, *Neither German Nor Pole*, 244–266, disputes the claim that Polish speakers who voted for Germany were in fact becoming Germans. On the dynamics of indifference in daily life, see also Brendan Karch, 'Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians between Germany and Poland, 1848–1945,' (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2010); Tara Zahra 'Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,' *Slavic Review* 69 (Spring 2010), 93–119.
53. Murdock, *Changing Places*, 158–162; Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East*, 46–47.
54. Thomas Childers notes, 'If the [Nazi] party's support was a mile wide, it was at critical points an inch deep,' *The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany 1919–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 268.
55. Hermann Beck, *The Fateful Alliance. German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933. The Machtergreifung in a New Light* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*, 299–300.
56. Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 66.
57. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Ippermann, *The Racial State. Germany 1933–1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 136–182.
58. Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008) 76–142.
59. Eric A. Johnson, *Nazi Terror. The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans* (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 253–301; Fritzsche, *Life and Death*, 19–75; Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*, trans. Richard Deveson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
60. Shelley Baranowski, *Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75–76, 120.
61. Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire. How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008).
62. Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, 144.
63. Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2008) 169–251; Karel Berghoff, *Harvest of Despair. Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), especially 162–179; Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, 78–101; 179–222; Götz Aly, *Final Solution: Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews* (London: Arnold Press, 1999), 59–81.
64. Ralf Gebel, 'Heim ins Reich!': *Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland (1938–1945)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Volker Zimmermann, *Die Sudetendeutschen im NS Staat: Politik und Stimmung der Bevölkerung im Reichsgau Sudetenland 1938–1945* (Essen: Klartext, 1999), Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 180–186 and 231–251.
65. Markus Leniger, *Nationalsozialistische 'Volkstumsarbeit' und Umsiedlungspolitik 1933–1945: Von der Minderheitenbetreuung zur Siedlerauslese* (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2006).
66. Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East*, 72; 147–190.
67. Doris L. Bergen, 'The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and the Exacerbation of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–1945,' *Journal of Contemporary History* 29 (1994), 569–582.
68. From *Nowiny Codziennie*, quoted in Brendan Karch, 'Nationalism on the Margins,' 223.

69. Rogers Brubaker, 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism,' in Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 132–146. On Alsace, Laird Boswell, 'From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces': Recasting French Identities in Alsace and Lorraine, 1918–1920,' *French Historical Studies* 23, no. 1 (2000), 129–162; Tara Zahra, 'The 'Minority Problem' and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands' *Contemporary European History* 17, no. 2 (2008), 137–165.
70. For example, Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
71. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), especially 290–292.

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